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CURRENT LAW AND POTENTIAL LEGAL ISSUES 
PERTAINING TO AUTOMATED, AUTONOMOUS 
AND CONNECTED VEHICLES 
William J. Kohler† & Alex Colbert-Taylor†† 
As vehicle automation technology advances toward vehicle 
autonomy and vehicles become increasingly connected, the legal 
community anticipates substantial legal issues and developments 
pertaining to such technology. The federal government has the power 
to regulate the design, sale, and use of autonomous vehicles, has 
expressed interest in doing so, and has provided recommendations for 
state-level regulations. A few states have recently established laws in 
an attempt to ensure the safe operation of autonomous vehicles. 
Moreover, the use and collection of locational and other personal data 
generated by and required for the effective operation of a network of 
connected autonomous vehicles presents significant privacy concerns. 
Such concerns must be balanced against the utility of the generated 
information in ensuring the safe and efficient operation of autonomous 
vehicle networks and the interests of carmakers and other industries 
involved in the commercial use of this data. Another concern relating 
to automation advances is the threat of cyberhacking and 
cyberterrorism. All of the above factors play a role in the timing of 
automated vehicle technologies’ implementation.* 
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INTRODUCTION 
Vehicle automation technologies that modestly manipulate a 
vehicle’s direction and speed without driver involvement have already 
been introduced into the market and are becoming increasingly 
commonplace. Different than mere warning systems, such as those that 
sense and warn a driver of fatigue or unsafe speed while approaching a 
turn, automated vehicle technologies assume a limited level of 
command over vehicle performance. Examples of currently available 
automated vehicle technologies include front crash prevention systems, 
adaptive cruise control, lane departure prevention systems, blind spot 
detection, park assist, backover prevention, and antilock brakes.1  
The commercial introduction and consumer acceptance of such 
vehicle automation technologies indicate the potential for autonomous 
vehicles that assume full command of vehicle operation except under 
specific limited circumstances. Although autonomous vehicles have 
not yet been offered for mainstream sale, development of autonomous 
vehicle technologies has advanced rapidly. Google has been a 
forerunner in developing and testing autonomous vehicle technolo-
gies,2 while traditional automotive manufacturers have placed an 
emphasis on limited automated vehicle technologies and their current 
 1. See Crash Avoidance Technologies, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, http:// 
www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/crash-avoidance-technologies/topicoverview (last visited Jan. 30, 
2015). 
 2. See Liz Gannes, Google’s New Self-Driving Car Ditches the Steering Wheel, RE/CODE 
(May 27, 2014, 6:59 PM PDT), http://recode.net/2014/05/27/googles-new-self-driving-car-
ditches-the-steering-wheel/. 
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determination that drivers must continue to be engaged in driving 
vehicles.3 
Technological advances in vehicle automation and autonomy will 
lead to significant legal developments. This article presents the current 
state of applicable law and reviews significant legal issues pertaining 
to automated and autonomous vehicles. In addition, because many 
vehicle automation and vehicle autonomy technologies are not feasible 
without electronic communications between vehicles or between 
vehicles and infrastructure—vehicle “connectivity”—this article also 
reviews data privacy issues relating to vehicle connectivity.  
In Part I, we provide a description of automated and autonomous 
vehicle technologies, as well as the parties involved in manufacturing 
and operating such technologies that establishes terminology and a 
framework for understanding the legal issues reviewed in this article.4 
Part II addresses the federal government’s power to regulate the design, 
sale, and use of autonomous vehicles.5 We discuss both the potential 
extent of this regulatory power under the United States Constitution 
and the federal agencies that may regulate areas related to autonomous 
vehicles.6 In Part III, we discuss the National Highway Transportation 
Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) expressed interest in regulating 
autonomous vehicles, what this regulation might look like, and 
NHTSA’s recommendations regarding state-level laws and 
regulations.7 In Part IV, we discuss the established autonomous vehicle 
laws of Nevada, California, Florida, the District of Columbia and 
Michigan,8 as well as failed legislative attempts to enact similar laws 
in other states.9 In Part V, we discuss legal issues related to the use and 
collection of locational and other personal data likely to be generated 
by and necessary for the operation of a network of connected 
autonomous motor vehicles.10 These issues include the balancing of 
privacy concerns against the utility of this information in ensuring the 
safe and efficient operation of the autonomous vehicle network and the 
 3. See Jarah Jacobsson Purewal, Toyota and Lexus Showcase Autonomous Research 
Vehicle, TECHHIVE (Jan. 7, 2013, 11:01 AM), http://www.techhive.com/article/2023858/toyota 
-and-lexus-showcase-autonomous-research-vehicle.html; GM Studying Operator Behavior in 
Self-Driving Vehicles, GM (June 20, 2012), http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail 
.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2012/Jun/0620_humanfactors.html. 
 4. See discussion infra Part I. 
 5. See discussion infra Part II. 
 6. See discussion infra Part II. 
 7. See discussion infra Part III. 
 8. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1–5. 
 9. See infra Part IV.B. 
 10. See infra Part V. 
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interests of carmakers and other industries involved in the technology 
in the commercial use of this data.11 In Part VI, we address the threat 
that cyberhacking poses to the autonomous vehicles and related 
technologies.12 In Part VII, we discuss the manner in which various 
factors, including regulatory efforts and automobile manufacturers’ 
willingness to commercialize technologies, may influence the timing 
of implementation of automated vehicle technologies.13  
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING THE TECHNOLOGY 
AND FUNCTIONALITY OF AUTOMATED, AUTONOMOUS AND 
CONNECTED VEHICLES SYSTEMS 
Some additional background information regarding automated 
and autonomous vehicle technologies will serve as a useful foundation 
for understanding resulting legal issues. In May 2013, the NHTSA 
issued a Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated 
Vehicles, a non-binding document in which the agency described the 
potential benefits of automated vehicle systems and provided 
recommendations for initial state regulation of automated vehicles.14 In 
this document, the NHTSA lays out a useful five-tier framework 
defining five relative degrees of automation in a given vehicle. These 
five levels are: 
• Level 0 (No Automation): “[D]river is in complete and sole control of 
the primary vehicle controls (brake, steering, throttle, and motive 
power) at all times, and is solely responsible for monitoring the 
roadway and for safe operation of all vehicle controls.”15 
• Level 1 (Function-Specific Automation): Examples include dynamic 
emergency braking, lane maintenance, and similar technologies that 
do not “replace driver vigilance.”16 
• Level 2 (Combined-Function Automation): Where multiple auto-
mation technologies working together (for instance, a combination of 
adaptive cruise-control, automatic emergency breaking, and lane 
 11. See infra Part V. 
 12. See infra Part VI. 
 13. See infra Part VII. 
 14. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PRELIMINARY 
STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 1 (2013) [hereinafter 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT], available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Auto 
mated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf; Press Release, NHTSA 14-13, U.S. Department of Transportation 
Releases Policy on Automated Vehicle Development, NHTSA (May 30, 2013), http://www.nhtsa 
.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/U.S.+Department+of+Transportation+Releases+Policy+o
n+Automated+Vehicle+Development. 
 15. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 4. 
 16. Id. 
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maintenance) under specific operating conditions, allow for the driver 
to have “his or her hands off the steering wheel AND foot off pedal at 
the same time.”17 
• Level 3 (Limited Self-Driving Automation): Allows for total 
autonomous control of the vehicle except in limited circumstances 
where the driver needs to assume control, such as in construction 
zones or where the system detects that its map data may be inaccurate, 
and it is up to the “vehicle to monitor for changes in those conditions 
requiring transition back to driver control.”18 
• Level 4 (Full Self-Driving Automation): Complete automation 
requiring no human participation beyond setting the destination.19 
NHTSA describes Level 3 as the highest level of automation 
currently being tested and states that it is not aware of any Level 4 
automated vehicle systems in existence.20 However, Google’s recently 
announced second-generation automated car prototype, which has no 
steering wheel, appears to belong to this category.21  
The types of technologies necessary for creating any level of 
autonomous vehicle can be categorized as either a sensor- or a 
connectivity-based solution.22 Sensor-based solutions, also referred to 
as Advanced Driver Assist Systems, “use a combination of advanced 
sensors, such as stereo cameras and long- and short-range RADAR, 
combined with actuators, control units, and integrating software, to 
enable cars to monitor and respond to their surroundings.”23 In contrast, 
connected-vehicle solutions “use wireless technologies to 
communicate in real time from vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and from 
vehicle to infrastructure (V2I), and vice versa.”24 The authors of the 
present article believe that the development of dependable technology 
within both of these categories, and the convergence of these catego-
ries, will be a necessary precursor to the commercial introduction of 
substantially autonomous vehicles.25 At those degrees of technological 
 17. Id. at 5. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 5 n.1. 
 21. See Gannes, supra note 2 (as the new Google car lacks any way for the occupant to 
assume control of the vehicle, it seems necessarily to be a Level 4 vehicle). 
 22. KPMG & CTR. FOR AUTO. RESEARCH, SELF-DRIVING CARS: THE NEXT  
REVOLUTION 10 (2012), available at http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/Articles 
Publications/Documents/self-driving-cars-next-revolution.pdf. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 12. 
 25. See id. at 25 (“Eventually, convergence will lead to vehicles that can drive themselves 
and operate autonomously. . .[C]onvergence also implies a multitude of redundant systems that 
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advancement—Level 3 and Level 4—the safe operation of vehicles 
without drivers is dependent on the reliable functioning of sensors 
detecting risks near a vehicle and the accurate and timely receipt by, 
and provision to, multiple vehicles of information about those vehicles 
and their respective environments.26   
In theory, as autonomous vehicle systems and their commercial 
introduction advance from Level 2 to Level 3 to Level 4, the number 
and types of participants involved in providing technology and data 
will change and increase. At Level 3, traditional vehicle manufacturers 
will, as they have already begun doing, create sensor-based solutions 
or obtain them from third parties for incorporation into vehicles. To 
advance to Levels 3 and 4, they must also create or obtain from third-
parties V2V and V2I technologies that are compatible across the full 
spectrum of vehicles, likely necessary to comply with yet-to-be-
designated governmental or industry association standards.27 In 
addition, a central party—akin to air traffic control—might provide and 
perhaps staff infrastructure, such as data hubs or traffic control stations, 
that is necessary to ensure the timely communication of information 
about vehicles and their environments. 
The timing of technology and its commercial introduction is 
uncertain. However, some analysts have attempted to forecast likely 
timelines. For example, Morgan Stanley anticipates further penetration 
of Level 1 vehicles over the next three years, the introduction of Level 
2 vehicles in three to five years, of Level 3 vehicles in five to ten years, 
and of Level 4 vehicles in twenty years or more.28    
can substitute for one another and yield safe operation even when failures occur. This crash less 
future would eliminate the injuries and property damage associated with vehicle crashes and save 
more than 30,000 lives a year.”). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 15 (“The regime for connected vehicles is fairly mature. . .but additional 
standards will be needed to ensure full interoperability. A mandate, if it occurs, should provide 
momentum to develop them.”); PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 6 (“NHTSA’s 
research will inform agency policy decisions, assist in developing an overall set of requirements 
and standards for automated vehicles.”); see also NHTSA V2V Security Credential Management 
System ANPRM, FR Doc. No. 2014–24482, 79 Fed. Reg. 61927 (Oct. 14, 2014) (announcing 
advance notice of proposed rulemaking and seeking comment on developing a standardized 
security credential management system for V2V applications). 
 28. RAVI SHANKER ET AL, MORGAN STANLEY RESEARCH, AUTONOMOUS CARS: SELF-
DRIVING THE NEW AUTO INDUSTRY PARADIGM 39 (2013). 
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II. EXISTING FEDERAL LAW AND POLICY RELATING TO  
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
As of the time of this writing, the U.S. federal government has not 
attempted to regulate autonomous motor vehicles as such, though 
various administrative agencies, as well as individual legislators, have 
signaled their intent to involve themselves in the area. There is no doubt 
that the federal government possesses substantial authority to regulate 
the design and operation of vehicles used on public roadways and 
legislation already exists that will allow certain federal administrative 
agencies to regulate many significant aspects of autonomous vehicle 
control technology. 
Federal agencies already involved with autonomous vehicle 
control technology include the U.S. Department of Transportation 
(DOT), which oversees the NHTSA and hosts the Intelligent 
Transportation Systems Joint Program Office (ITS JPO). The NHTSA, 
established by the Highway Safety Act of 1970,29 possesses regulatory 
authority to, inter alia, develop and enforce safety standards for new 
motor vehicles30 and aftermarket replacement or improvement car 
components or equipment.31 An example of relevant rulemaking by 
NTSHA are its recent changes to rules that transform the Agency’s 
long-standing recommendation that all new vehicles sold in the United 
States include an event data recorder (EDR) into a mandate.32 EDRs, 
as currently used, are functionally analogous to an airplane’s black box; 
recording and archiving for relative short periods of time data from the 
vehicle’s various electronic control units for analysis in the case of an 
accident or malfunction.33 The data typically collected include 
information concerning: “vehicle speed; whether the brake was 
activated in the moments before a crash; crash forces at the moment of 
impact; information about the state of the engine throttle; air bag 
deployment timing and air bag readiness prior to the crash; and whether 
the vehicle occupant's seat belt was buckled.”34 Most newer vehicles 
 29. Pub. L. No. 91-605, § 202(a), 84 Stat. 1739, 1739–40 (1970) (codified as amended at 
49 U.S.C. § 105). 
 30. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–33118 (2013). 
 31. See id. § 30102 (a)(7)(B). 
 32. NHTSA Event Data Recorders Rules, 49 C.F.R. pt. 563 (2013). 
 33. See 49 C.F.R. § 563.5 (defining “event data recorder”); Press Release, NHTSA 46-10, 
U.S. DOT Proposes Broader Use of Event Data Recorders to Help Improve Vehicle Safety, 
NHTSA (Dec. 7, 2012) http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/U.S.+DOT+Pro 
poses+Broader+Use+of+Event+Data+Recorders+to+Help+Improve+Vehicle+Safety 
[hereinafter EDR Press Release]. 
 34. EDR Press Release, supra note 33; see also 49 C.F.R. § 563.7 (data elements). 
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are already equipped with EDRs, some of which can wirelessly 
communicate with emergency response centers in the event of a 
crash.35 The potential role of an EDR as a site where data from all of a 
vehicle’s computers might be aggregated and communicated to an 
external network makes EDRs a potentially central piece of 
technological hardware to watch with legal considerations, such as data 
privacy, in mind. 
The ITS JPO, a branch of the DOT within its Office of the 
Assistance Secretary for Research and Technology, is responsible for 
“[c]onducting an ongoing intelligent transportation system program to 
research, develop, and operationally test intelligent transportation 
systems and to provide technical assistance in the nationwide appli-
cation.”36 Currently, the ITS JPO is engaged in the development and 
promulgation of intelligent transportation standards that will likely 
serve as the foundation of V2V and V2I networks for connected and 
autonomous vehicle technologies in the future.37 One example of ITS 
IPO’s efforts has been its role in developing standards for wireless 
communication for connected vehicles, including technologies using 
the reserved 5.9GHz Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) 
bandwidth range.38 DSRC was specifically reserved by the Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC) for enabling wireless 
communication between multiple vehicles on the road and between 
vehicles and roadside infrastructure.39 Envisioned as a cornerstone of 
connected vehicle technologies, relatively few licenses have been 
issued to make use of this bandwidth.40 DSRC applications are in their 
infancy, but it is likely that this bandwidth range will become essential 
 35. Cheryl Dancey Balough & Richard C. Balough, Cyberterrorism On Wheels: Are 
Today’s Cars Vulnerable to Attack, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov. 2013, at 6, available at http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2013/11/cyberterrorism-cars-201311.au 
thcheckdam.pdf. 
 36. Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP–21) Act, Pub. L. No. 12-141, § 
53003, 126 Stat. 405 (2012); About ITS, ITS JPO, http://www.its.dot.gov/its_jpo.htm (last updated 
Jan. 22, 2015 9:50 AM). 
 37. About the ITS Research Program, ITS JPO, http://www.its.dot.gov/its_program 
/about_its.htm (last updated Dec. 11, 2014, 3:57 PM). 
 38. See FCC Rules to Allocate the 5.850-5.925 GHz Band to the Mobile Serv. for DSRC 
of Intelligent Transp. Servs., No. 99-305, 14 FCC Rcd. 18221 (1999) (report and order) 
[hereinafter DSRC Order].  
 39. Id.; see also Robert B. Kelly & Mark D. Johnson, Defining a Stable, Protected and 
Secure Spectrum Environment for Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1271, 1281–
82 (2012). 
 40. Kelly & Johnson, supra note 39. 
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to connected and autonomous vehicles as these technologies become 
prevalent.41 
Beyond these transportation-oriented federal agencies, agencies 
such as the FCC and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will be 
involved in regulating aspects or applications of the technology—the 
former in administrating wireless communication standards used by 
autonomous vehicles, and the latter in regulating the use of consumer 
data, as they have done or proposed doing in the related fields.42 
Elsewhere in the government, the Department of Defense has been a 
prominent supporter of autonomous motor vehicles, with Defense 
Advanced Research Programs Agency hosting multiple competitions, 
such as the 2007 Urban Challenge in Victorville, California, to 
encourage the development and public visibility of this technology.43 
It is almost inevitable that arrival at Level 4 will be accompanied 
by an extensive regulatory regime that will ensure the standardization, 
safety, and security of autonomous vehicles and their underlying 
technologies. It is clear that, for instance, in the absence of such a 
regime, there would be no guarantee of the interoperability of the V2V 
and V2I systems used in different vehicles, leading at least to 
significantly less efficient automated roadway than the smooth-flowing 
intersections, intelligently managed traffic patterns, and close-packed 
platoons described by industry technologists.44 Beyond these 
inefficiencies, one can easily imagine that incompatible V2V and V2I 
systems operating on the same communication channels could interfere 
with each other, leading to potentially catastrophic accidents. 
 41. See generally NHTSA V2V Security Credential Management System ANPRM, FR 
Doc. No. 2014–24482, 79 Fed. Reg. 61927 (Oct. 14, 2014) (requesting input from the public on 
future rulemaking in reference to secure V2V communication systems using the DSRC spectrum).  
 42. See DSRC Order, supra note 38; FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA 
OF RAPID CHANGE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protec 
ting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 43. See Urban Challenge, DARPA, http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge/ (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2015). 
 44. See, e.g., Emily Badger, What Intersections Would Look Like in a World of Driverless 
Cars, CITYLAB (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.citylab.com/tech/2012/03/what-intersections-would 
-look-world-driverless-cars/1377/; Sebastian Thrun, Leave the Driving to the Car, and Reap 
Benefits in Safety and Mobility, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2011, at D4 (describes platooning). 
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III. NHTSA’S EXPRESSED INTEREST IN REGULATING AUTOMATED 
VEHICLES 
NHTSA is the federal agency that has thus far been the most 
visible and active in promoting automated vehicles. It has announced 
its interest in regulating autonomous vehicles, as well as its willingness 
to advance and support the wide adoption of related technology. As its 
name suggests, the NHTSA’s essential function is to maximize 
highway safety. The Agency describes its mission as being “to save 
lives, prevent injuries, and reduce economic costs due to road traffic 
crashes,”45 and as to “achiev[e] the highest standards of excellence in 
motor vehicle and highway safety.”46 The NHTSA is also responsible 
for setting Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, and therefore 
possesses broad authority to regulate the design and use of future 
autonomous motor vehicles,47 including the power to preempt contrary 
state regulation.48 
Insight into NHTSA’s internal concerns about the issues raised by 
autonomous vehicles and potential regulatory solutions for overcoming 
these issues can be gleaned from the Agency’s Preliminary 
Statement.49 Further information can be found in The Potential 
Regulatory Challenges of Increasingly Autonomous Motor Vehicles, an 
article authored by Stephen P. Wood, NHTSA’s Assistant Chief 
Counsel for Vehicle Standards and Harmonization, and three NHTSA 
and DOT Attorney–Advisors.50 
 45. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THIS IS NHTSA 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/reports/810552.pdf. 
 46. About NHTSA, NHTSA, http://www.nhtsa.gov/About (lasted visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
 47. Stephen P. Wood et al., The Potential Regulatory Challenges of Increasingly 
Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1423, 1441 (2012). “The views expressed 
in that article fairly encompass the agency’s views of its regulatory authority.” NAT’L HIGHWAY 
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., REP. NO. DOT HS 812 014, VEHICLE-TO-VEHICLE COMMUNICATIONS: 
READINESS OF V2V TECHNOLOGY FOR APPLICATION 33 n.40 (2014) [hereinafter V2V 
READINESS REPORT]. 
 48. See 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (2013) (expressly preempting State laws that apply to the 
same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment as an FMVSS issued 
under this chapter); see also, Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. 
REV. 521, 545 (2012) (describing NTSHA’s broad power to preempt state law). 
 49. See generally PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14.   
 50. Wood et al., supra note 47, at 1423. Note that the article specifically disclaims any 
relationship between its opinions and conclusions and the position of NHTSA. Id. at 1423 n.1. 
Wood presented that paper at the Santa Clara Law’s spring 2012 symposium on autonomous 
vehicles. Symposium, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1145 
(2012). The papers presented at this conference and published in Volume 52 of the Santa Clara 
Law Review are a particularly rich source for perspectives on the law of autonomous vehicles. 
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In its Preliminary Statement, the NHTSA recognizes many 
potential societal and economic benefits that may arise from autono-
mous vehicles, from reduced greenhouse gas emissions to enhanced 
access for disabled people.51 The Agency was careful to emphasize that 
its mission is safety-oriented, and that its purpose in involving itself 
early on in the process of developing and regulating autonomous 
vehicles is above all because the technology has “the potential to reduce 
significantly the many thousands of fatalities and injuries that occur 
each year as a result of motor vehicle crashes.”52 NHTSA suggested 
that “[p]reventing significant numbers of crashes will, in addition to 
relieving the enormous emotional toll on families, also greatly reduce 
the enormous related societal costs—lives lost, hospital stays, days of 
work missed, and property damage—that total in the hundreds of 
billions of dollars each year.” 53 
Although NTSHA does not appear ready to issue its own 
nationwide regulations specifically relating to autonomous vehicles, it 
made several recommendations for how state governments should 
regulate the testing and use of autonomous vehicles. The Agency 
recommended that states wishing to allow testing should require 
specific driver’s license endorsements for operators of autonomous 
vehicles, and that a licensed operator should be required to be seated in 
the driver’s seat, with the ability to immediately assume control over 
the vehicle during all testing on public roads. It recommends that states 
require businesses seeking to test an autonomous vehicle certify that 
the vehicle has already been operated for some unspecified number of 
miles in self-driving mode, and in traffic and environmental conditions 
similar to those in which it would be tested on public roads. Data from 
these earlier tests should be submitted to the state. The NHTSA also 
recommends that state regulatory bodies require testing businesses to 
submit plans demonstrating their efforts to minimize risk to others. The 
Agency also suggests that states require businesses that test 
autonomous vehicles report information about crashes or near-crashes 
involving the vehicles, and also any instances in which the vehicles 
prompt their human operators to assume control because of the failure 
of the automated system to function properly.54 
At this still-early stage in the development of autonomous 
vehicles, the NHTSA remains deferential to individual States insofar 
 51. See PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 1.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 12–14. 
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as the States seeking to regulate the testing of prototype vehicles on 
public roads, “believ[ing] that states are well suited to address issues 
such as licensing, driver training, and conditions for operation related 
to specific types of vehicles.”55 However, the Agency has expressed its 
preference that States not permit the operation of autonomous motor 
vehicles for any purpose other than testing.56 Among the States that 
have passed statutes regulating the testing of autonomous vehicles, 
Michigan is the only state that has explicitly banned their use in 
circumstances other than testing and research.57 
It is interesting to note that although no federal law or regulation 
currently is explicit in prohibiting the use of autonomous vehicles 
outside of the context of testing,58 the NTSHA’s recommendations 
appear to presume that operating autonomous vehicles on public roads 
is illegal in the absence of either state or federal laws specifically 
authorizing their use.59 In contrast, legal scholar Bryant Walker Smith 
views the use of autonomous vehicles on public roads and highways as 
probably already legal, precisely because they are not explicitly 
prohibited in the United States under the Geneva Convention, Federal 
Motor Vehicle Standards, or state laws.60 Smith’s theory is based on a 
statutory reading to the effect that everything is permitted unless 
explicitly prohibited.61 However, because NHTSA has the express 
power to conduct investigations into safety defects and can recall and 
remedy of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment determined to 
have a safety defect,62 it is not a stretch to imagine that NHTSA would 
promptly exercise this power if autonomous vehicles were prematurely 
introduced onto American roadways. Therefore, NHTSA may exercise 
its powers as, effectively, a prohibition, at least if it can reasonably find 
that the use of autonomous vehicles presents some safety risk. Such a 
 55. Id. at 10. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.663 (2014) (“Except as otherwise provided in section 
665, a person shall not operate an automated motor vehicle upon a highway or street in automatic 
mode.”); § 257.665 (exemptions for research or testing).  
 58. See Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles are Probably Legal in the United States, 
1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411, 412–13 (2014). 
 59. See PRELIMINARY STATEMENT supra note 14, at 10–11 (The recommendation that 
states not act to “permit operation of self-driving vehicles for purposes other than testing” implies 
that without such permission the use of autonomous vehicles would be unlawful). 
 60. See Smith, supra note 58. 
 61. Id. at 413. 
 62. 49 U.S.C. § 30166(b) (2013) (authority to conduct inspections or investigations); 
§ 30120 (remedies for defects or noncompliance): § 30118 (notification of defects or 
noncompliance). See generally Stephen P. Wood et al., supra note 47. 
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risk could probably be found in the mere proliferation of non-
standardized and potentially incompatible autonomous technologies 
operating simultaneously.  
In addition, Smith attempts to demonstrate how each prevailing 
law (the Geneva Convention, federal law, and state law) does not dis-
allow operation of autonomous vehicles, substantially relying on the 
concept that, even though such laws require or assume that drivers must 
operate vehicles, they do not necessarily require that a driver be human. 
He states: “‘Driver’ is a broad concept—so much so that, at least 
textually, even nonhuman persons can be drivers.”63 We, however, 
believe that the foundation of each regime discussed by Smith is the 
material assumption that a human driver—not driverless technology or 
a fictitious legal person that might be deemed a driver—is operating a 
vehicle being driven on public roadways.  
Hypothetically, were Google or another company to start selling 
autonomous car conversion kits right now, enabling Smith’s inter-
pretations to be tested in court, we believe it more likely that a judge 
would endorse a more conservative textual reading of these laws. We 
believe that, because these laws were written well before any serious 
discussion of the possibility of autonomous vehicles, where they refer 
to a “driver” must be interpreted according to their plain meaning in 
light of usage at the time they were adopted. The courts are likely to 
find, then, that for a vehicle to be legal in the current regime, it must 
have a human operator, and therefore they will probably accept 
NHTSA’s apparent position that states or other governments must 
specifically authorize automated vehicles to be driven on highways. 
IV. STATE LAW AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
The NHTSA recommends that states not develop detailed safety 
regulations over autonomous vehicles, citing the “rapid evolution and 
wide variations in self-driving technologies” as making this 
impractical.64 Instead, the Agency recommends that states enforce four 
basic principles: (1) ensure that “the process for transitioning from self-
driving mode to driver control is safe, simple, and timely”; (2) “self-
driving test vehicles should have the capability of detecting, recording, 
and informing the driver that the system of automated technologies has 
malfunctioned”; (3) “installation and operation of any self-driving 
vehicle technologies does not disable any federally required safety 
features or systems”; and (4) “self-driving test vehicles record 
 63. See Smith, supra note 58, at 463. 
 64. See PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 12–13. 
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information about the status of the automated control technologies in 
the event of a crash or loss of vehicle control.”65 At the time that 
NHTSA issued its Preliminary Statement, three States had already 
enacted autonomous vehicle legislation legalizing the operation of 
autonomous vehicles on public roads for the purpose of testing. These 
laws are substantially consistent with NHTSA’s state policy 
recommendations.  
A. Enacted Legislation 
We will now look in detail at the recently enacted state legislation 
authorizing the testing of autonomous vehicles. 
1. Nevada 
In June 2011, Nevada became the first State to authorize the 
operation of automated vehicles on public roads.66 Nevada defines 
autonomous vehicle as one equipped with autonomous technology that 
which has the capability to drive the motor vehicle without the active 
control or monitoring of a human operator.67 Before testing the vehicle 
on state highways, the operator must submit proof of insurance for 
$5,000,000 or post a surety bond or other form of security for the same 
amount.68 The car also must be equipped with several safety measures, 
including a means of easily engaging and disengaging the autonomous 
technology by the human operator, a visual indicator inside the vehicle 
that indicates when the autonomous technology is in operation, and a 
mechanism of alerting the human operator to take control if the 
autonomous technology fails.69 Upon approval by the state, the tester 
will be licensed to operate the vehicle only in specified geographic 
zones, but may apply to test in additional zones.70 When testing, the 
human operator must be seated in a position that allows the operator to 
take immediate control of the vehicle if needed, monitoring the 
autonomous technology, and capable of immediately taking over 
 65. Id. at 13–14. 
 66. Act of June 16, 2011, ch. 472, §§ 2, 8, [2011] Nev. Stat. 2,873, 2,876 (codified as 
amended at NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 482A.010–.200 (2014)); Adopted Regulation Providing for the 
Operation of Autonomous Vehicles, 174 Nev. Reg. Admin. Regs. R084-11 (Nev. Dep’t of Motor 
Vehicles Feb. 15, 2012) (codified as amended at NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 482A (2014)). 
 67. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 482A.025, .030 (2014) (defining “autonomous technology” and 
“autonomous vehicle”); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.010 (2014) (interpreting definition of 
autonomous technology to exclude any vehicle unable to perform the operations of driving 
without active control or monitoring of a human person).   
 68. NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.060. 
 69. Id. § 482A.080(2)(a)–(c). 
 70. Id. § 482A.120. 
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manual control of the vehicle in case of failure of the automated 
technology.71 Nevada also releases the manufacturer of the vehicle 
from liability resulting from the third party conversion of the vehicle to 
an autonomous vehicle.72 
Nevada was also the first state to require its motor vehicle 
department to propose regulations for autonomous vehicles by a certain 
date.73 Nevada adopted its department’s proposed regulations in 
February 2012.74 The regulations require a special driver’s license 
certification and license plates, along with pre-operation certifications 
by the manufacturer that the vehicle complies with safety regulations, 
including an electronic data recorder, separate from the NHTSA-
mandated EDR, that stores information about the condition of 
autonomous vehicle system’s state for at least thirty seconds prior to 
any accident.75 Nevada requires a cash deposit or surety deposit before 
issuing a license to test autonomous vehicles, in the amount of 
$5,000,000.76 A certificate will be issued to the licensee that specifies 
the geographic regions where a vehicle is allowed to operate.77 
Nevada’s regulations also require the presence of a second human in 
the vehicle, also trained in the operation of the vehicle and its capa-
bilities and limitations, which “shall each actively monitor for any 
aberration in the functioning of the autonomous vehicle while it is 
engaged.”78 
The State also instituted similar certification requirements before 
the vehicles may be sold to the public.79 Either a manufacturer or 
licensed technology certification facility must issue the certificate of 
compliance in order for the vehicle to be sold, as well as a certification 
that the driver is able to operate the technology.80 By allowing 
independent facilities to certify autonomous vehicles, Nevada is 
creating the opportunity for a market of privately operated certification 
facilities. Since this requirement is only for vehicles sold with 
 71. Id. § 482A.070. 
 72. Id. § 482A.090. 
 73. Act of June 16, 2011, ch. 472, § 12, [2011] Nev. Stat. 2873, 2877 (2011). 
 74. Regulation Providing for the Operation of Autonomous Vehicles, 174 Nev. Reg. 
Admin. Regs. R084-11 (Nev. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles Feb. 15, 2012) (codified as amended at 
NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 482A (2014)). 
 75. NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 482A.040, .050, .110 (2014). 
 76. NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.060 (2014). 
 77. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.120(1). 
 78. Id. § 482A.130. 
 79. Id. § 482A.190. 
 80. Id.  
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autonomous technology, it readies Nevada for the commercialization 
of autonomous vehicles. While an operator who wishes to drive an 
autonomous vehicle for non-testing purposes still must obtain the 
vehicle, certificate of compliance, endorsement on his driver’s license, 
and private insurance, Nevada’s regulations allow these processes to 
begin. 
2. Florida 
Florida, in April 2012, enacted legislation containing provisions 
that were similar or identical to Nevada law regarding autonomous 
vehicles.81 These provisions are the definition of an autonomous vehi-
cle,82 the required safety measures for use of the automated technology 
in the vehicle,83 a $5,000,000 insurance requirement,84 and the release 
of liability for vehicle manufacturers.85 Florida law requires a human 
operator who must be a licensed driver affiliated with the company 
conducting the test, with no special certifications required. Although 
Florida defines operator to include someone who causes the 
autonomous technology to engage, regardless of whether or not that 
person is present in the vehicle while it operates in autonomous mode, 
a human operator must still be present in the vehicle during testing on 
State roads.86 The legislation includes the statement that “the 
Legislature finds that the state does not prohibit or specifically regulate 
the testing or operation of autonomous technology in motor vehicles on 
public roads.”87 The statute required Florida’s Department of Highway 
Safety and Motor Vehicles to prepare a report making additional 
recommendations for legislative or regulatory action by February 
2014.88 The document the Florida Department of Highway Safety and 
Motor Vehicles eventually published compares its interpretation of the 
requirements of the Florida law with the NHTSA recommendations and 
the laws passed by Florida, Michigan, California, and their 
implementing regulations.89 It concludes that the Florida legislation, 
 81. Vehicles with Autonomous Technology Act, ch. 2012-111, [2012] Fla. Laws 1223.   
 82. Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law, FLA. STAT. § 316.003(90) (2014). 
 83. Id. § 319.145. 
 84. Id. § 316.86(1). 
 85. Id. § 316.86(2). 
 86. Id. §§ 316.85(2), 316.86(1). 
 87. Vehicles with Autonomous Technology Act, ch. 2012-111, § 1(2), [2012] Fla. Laws 
1223. 
 88. Id. § 5(3). 
 89. JULIUS L. JONES, FLA. DEP’T OF HIGH. SAFETY AND MOTOR VEH., HSMV NO. 13-008, 
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE REPORT (2014), available at http://www.flhsmv.gov/html/HSMV 
AutonomousVehicleReport2014.pdf. 
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interpreted as setting very minimal barriers to parties interested in 
testing vehicles, needed no immediate changes—“In order to 
encourage innovation and foster a positive business environment 
toward that end, the Department proposes no changes to existing 
Florida laws and rules at this time.”90  
3. California 
The legislation enacted in California uses the language of Nevada 
and Florida to define autonomous vehicle and the vehicle’s operator, 
but with additional specifications.91 California defines the 
manufacturer of an autonomous vehicle as the one who equips the 
vehicle with autonomous technology, whether or not that person is the 
original physical manufacturer of the underlying vehicle.92 The 
California statute also does not release the original vehicle 
manufacturer from liability resulting from a third party installation of 
autonomous technology, nor does it designate the third party installer 
as liable for defects. California permits testing of automated vehicles 
on public roads if the operator is an employee of the testing company, 
is seated in the driver’s seat monitoring the operations of the 
autonomous technology, is capable of taking over manual operation of 
the vehicle, and the testing company has an insurance policy in the 
amount of $5,000,000.93 
The vehicle must also contain a separate device that stores 
autonomous technology sensor data for thirty seconds before a crash 
while operating in autonomous mode, which must not be destroyed for 
three years after the collision.94 California does not suggest who the 
owner of that data is. Even though the capture of information 
surrounding autonomous technology in individual vehicles was one of 
the main recommendations in NHTSA’s Preliminary Statement, 
California was the only state to require it statutorily.95 Nevada’s imple-
menting regulations have made it clear that such a system is required 
there, as well.96 
 90. Id. at 7. 
 91. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2014); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, §§ 227.00–
.52 (2014). 
 92. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(a)(5). 
 93. Id. § 38750(b)(3). 
 94. Id. § 38750(c)(1)(G). 
 95. Act of Sept. 25, 2012, § 2, [2012] Cal. Stat. ch. 570. 
 96. Regulation Providing for the Operation of Autonomous Vehicles § 8, LCB File No. 
R084-11, 174 Nev. Reg. Admin. Regs. 1223 (Feb. 15, 2012). 
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The legislation adopted in California also sets a guideline for 
allowing operation for purposes other than testing. The manufacturer 
must apply for such permission, including in the application proof that 
the vehicle has specific mechanisms for engaging, monitoring, and 
disengaging the autonomous technology.97 In cases of failure of the 
autonomous technology, the vehicle must have multiple means for the 
driver to take control.98 If the driver does not take control, the vehicle 
must be capable of coming to a complete stop.99 Additionally, the 
Department of Motor Vehicles must adopt specific regulations for 
allowing operation of autonomous vehicles by 2015.100 The 
Department submitted its proposed regulations for testing vehicles in 
late 2013.101 The testing regulations were adopted on May 19, 2014 and 
became effective on September 16, 2014.102 Before enactment of this 
legislation, California did not prohibit or specifically regulate operation 
of autonomous vehicles on public roads. 
California’s implementing regulations appear in many aspects to 
be similar but not identical to those adopted by Nevada. Notable 
differences between the regulations adopted by the two states include 
that California does not contemplate private certification companies 
being authorized to approve vehicles for testing or sale, that its regu-
lations do not impose geographical limits on its testing licenses, and 
that California only requires one person be present in the vehicle during 
testing, rather than Nevada’s two.103 
4. District of Columbia 
The District of Columbia also enacted legislation with the purpose 
of authorizing “autonomous vehicles to operate on District 
roadways.”104 This language indicates that the District believed 
autonomous vehicles were not authorized to do so prior to legislation. 
The District defines autonomous vehicle in the same manner as Nevada 
and requires only that the driver have a manual control override feature 
 97. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(c)(1) (West 2014). 
 98. Id. § 38750(c)(1)(D). 
 99. Id. § 38750(c)(1)(C). 
 100. Id. § 38750(d)(1). 
 101. Notice of Proposed Regulatory Action Relating to Autonomous Vehicles, File No. 
2013-1113-02, 48-Z Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 1859, 1868 (Nov. 29, 2013). 
 102. See First Set of Autonomous Vehicle Regulations are Now in Effect, CAL. DMV, 
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/newsrel/newsrel14/2014_61a (lasted visited Jan. 
1, 2015). 
 103. Compare CAL. CODE REGS. § 38750 (2014); with NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 482A (2014). 
 104. Autonomous Vehicle Act of 2012, D.C. Law No. 19-278, 20 D.C. Stat. 906 (2013) 
(codified at D.C. CODE §§ 50-2351 to -2354 (LexisNexis 2014)). 
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for the autonomous technology and be seated in the car prepared to take 
control at any moment, and that the vehicle is capable of operating in 
compliance with District traffic laws at all times.105 The vehicle itself 
must be either a 2009 model year or less than four years old when it is 
converted to an autonomous vehicle.106 The District limits liability for 
vehicle manufacturers when a third party installs the autonomous 
technology.107 Although the legislation placed further rulemaking 
power with the Mayor,108 this authority was subsequently delegated to 
the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles.109 The Department 
promptly acted on this rulemaking authority, providing notice of its 
intent to adopt rules “establish[ing] a class of autonomous vehicles and 
procedures and fees for registration, titling, and issuance of permits to 
operate autonomous vehicles.”110 
5. Michigan 
Most recently, Michigan passed legislation permitting the opera-
tion of autonomous vehicles on public roads.111 While Michigan 
expressly authorizes the operation of these vehicles for testing 
purposes, it is the only state to specifically ban operation for non-
testing purposes,112 a measure publicly criticized by Google.113 Before 
testing, Michigan requires manufacturers to register for special license 
plates, which must be displayed on the vehicle during testing on roads 
and highways,114 and submit proof of insurance.115 The vehicle must 
only be operated by an employee or other person authorized by the 
automated technology manufacturer while researching or testing the 
vehicle on a street or highway.116 One person must to present in the 
 105. D.C. CODE § 50-2351(1) (definition of autonomous vehicle); § 50-2352(1)–(3) 
(requirements to operate autonomous vehicle on public roadways).  
 106. Id. § 50-2353(b). 
 107. Id. § 50-2353(a). 
 108. Id. § 50-2354. 
 109. Mayor’s Order Delegating Rulemaking Authority under Autonomous Vehicle Act to 
Director of DMV, Ord. No. 2014-058, 61 D.C. REG. 2,501 (Mar. 21, 2014). 
 110. Notice of Proposed Rule Amending Title 18 of the D.C. Municipal Regulations, 
61 D.C. REG. 3,587 (Apr. 4, 2014). 
 111. Act of Dec. 20, 2013, Pub. Act No. 231, [2013] Mich. Pub. Acts (codified at MICH. 
COMP. LAWS §§ 257.2b, 35a, 36, 244, 602b, 663, 665–66, 817 (2014)).  
 112. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.663, 665 (2014). 
 113. Melissa Anders, Autonomous Vehicle Testing Now Allowed Under Michigan Law, 
MLIVE.COM (Dec. 27, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/12/ 
autonomous_vehicle_testing_now.html. 
 114. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.244(3). 
 115. Id. § 257.665(1). 
 116. Id. § 257.665(2)(a). 
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vehicle during testing and must be capable of immediately taking over 
the vehicle’s movements.117 Michigan law also provides for civil 
penalties for a person violating automated vehicle laws.118 Michigan’s 
Transportation Department is also required to prepare and submit a 
report, in consultation with the Secretary of State and industry experts, 
“to the senate standing committees on transportation and economic 
development and to the house of representatives standing committees 
on transportation and commerce recommending any additional 
legislative or regulatory action that may be necessary for the continued 
safe testing of automated motor vehicles and automated technology 
installed in motor vehicles.”119 In a separate act, Michigan removed 
liability for vehicle manufacturers if damages were caused by 
autonomous technology and that technology was installed by a third 
party without the vehicle manufacturer’s involvement.120  
B. Failed Legislation 
State bills that have failed to become law illustrate some of the 
issues that stand in the way of universal state acceptance of autonomous 
vehicles. For example, in Arizona, Representative Jeff Dial introduced 
legislation that would not require a human to be seated in an 
autonomous vehicle, a break from the states that have enacted laws.121 
The bill failed to clear Arizona’s House Transportation Committee.122 
Colorado’s bill was halted by its own sponsor, Senator Greg 
Brophy.123 The bill faced considerable opposition from Google and 
 117. Id. § 257.665(2)(b). 
 118. Id. § 257.666. 
 119. Id. § 257.665(3) (no later than February 1, 2016). 
 120. Act of Dec. 26, 2013, Pub. Act No. 251, [2013] Mich. Pub. Acts (codified at MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 600.2949b (2014)). 
 121. Autonomous Motor Vehicles, H.B. 2167, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013); see 
also, Howard Fischer, Arizona Lawmakers May Give OK for Driverless Cars, E. VALLEY TRIB. 
(Jan. 31, 2013, 7:03 AM), http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/arizona/politics/article_7bd7e948-
6b35-11e2-9d8e-0019bb2963f4.html; Dan Strumpf, Liability Concerns Put the Brakes on 
Driverless Cars, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2013, 12:01 AM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/drivers-seat 
/2013/01/28/liability-concerns-put-the-brakes-on-driverless-cars/. 
 122. Presentation by the Ariz. Department of Transportation: Hearing on H.B. 2167 Before 
the H. Comm. on Transp., 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013). The minutes, agenda, a video 
recording of this hearing are available on the Legislature’s website, H. Rep. Standing Comm. on 
Transp., Committee Info, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., AZLEG.GOV., http://azleg.gov/Committee 
Info.asp?Committee_ID=5&Session_ID=110 (last visited on Dec. 12, 2014). 
 123. Monte Wahley, Colorado Driverless Car Bill Shelved Until Further Notice, DENV. 
POST (Feb. 5, 2013, 6:44PM MST), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_22526956 
/colorado-driverless-car-bill-shelved-until-further-notice. 
 
11_ARTICLE_KOHLER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2015  3:54 PM 
2015] AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 119 
from trial lawyers.124 Rather than risk a vote against the legislation, 
Brophy asked that it simply be postponed.125 Google did not identify 
its concerns publicly.126 Another concern was brought up in Oregon, 
whose bill did not pass the Transportation Committee. Legislators there 
seemed to simply be concerned about the unforeseeable risks of 
automated vehicles. The hearing took place only a few days after the 
Boston Marathon bombing and Representative Cliff Bentz, possibly 
influenced by this act of terrorism, identified vehicles as carriers of 
bombs as a particular concern.127 
Finally, New Jersey’s legislation to regulate autonomous vehicles 
failed to clear committee after testimony by Scott Mackey, a 
representative from the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers.128 
Mackey viewed state legislation on automated vehicles as premature, 
estimating widespread use of the vehicles to be about ten years away.129 
In addition, he stated that if each state enacted slightly different 
regulations, it would be difficult for manufacturers to standardize the 
technology for the wider market.130 Mackey’s statements appear to 
suggest that a code of federal, not state, regulations for automated 
vehicles may promote their use more quickly. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Joseph Rose, Oregon Robo-Car Bill Stalls as ODOT Moves Forward With ‘Connected 
Car’ Study, OREGONLIVE (April 18, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com 
/commuting/index.ssf/2013/04/oregon_driverless_car_bill_sta.html. 
 128. For more information, see About the Alliance, AUTO ALLIANCE, http://www.auto 
alliance.org/about-the-alliance (last visited Dec. 12, 2014). 
 129. Andrew George, Driverless cars in N.J.? Assembly Panel Considers Legislation 
Authorizing Tests, N.J. BIZ. (Nov. 25, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://www.njbiz.com/article/20131125 
/NJBIZ01/131129789/Driverless-cars-in-NJ?-Assembly-panel-considers-legislation-authorizing 
-tests. 
 130. Id. 
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C. Concluding Thoughts on State Legislation 
Since driverless technology is still very young, allowing the 
general public access to automated vehicles would be taking unknown 
risks. While each State’s policy has different specifics, the States that 
have passed autonomous vehicle testing legislation, in line with the 
NHTSA’s recommendations, all require licensing of the vehicle’s 
human operator as well as prior approval from the state authorizing the 
testing company prior to driving an automated vehicle on public roads. 
Apart from these pre-operation requirements, States have instituted 
stipulations for insurance, safety mechanisms, and a human operator. 
States have also chosen to address liability for autonomous technology 
defects, future non-testing operation, and requiring future regulatory 
action. Each of the States that has enacted legislation has either 
authorized the eventual deployment of autonomous vehicles for 
operation by the general public or remained silent on the issue, with the 
exception of Michigan, which has only authorized testing of 
autonomous vehicles and has explicitly banned the operation of 
autonomous vehicles in other contexts. 
V. PRIVACY AND DATA USE 
Far more profusely than today’s vehicles, mature and market-
ready autonomous vehicles will generate and broadcast personal data, 
the use and storage of which will implicate important privacy rights in 
complicated ways that will likely have to be faced well before Level 3 
and Level 4 vehicles become a commercial reality.131 Although 
exclusively sensor-based autonomous vehicles are certainly a possi-
bility,132 many of the most compelling reasons for adopting self-driving 
cars are dependent on the vehicles sharing and coordinating data with 
each other, both locally and through centralized infrastructure. It is self-
evident that the efficient management of traffic at intersections, the 
intelligent distribution of traffic to minimize congestion, and the ability 
of autonomous vehicles to safely travel in close-packed platoons, for 
instance, are all largely or completely reliant on communication both 
between the individual vehicles and other cars in the vicinity, and 
between the autonomous vehicles and an external network. Even if this 
 131. Cf. Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV.  
1171, 1239 (2012). 
 132. Google’s self-driving cars are an example of an almost exclusively sensor-based 
technology. See Erico Guizzo, How Google’s Self-Driving Car Works, Posted in Automation Blog, 
IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 18, 2011, 9:00 GMT), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics 
/artificial-intelligence/how-google-self-driving-car-works.  
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data is scrubbed of unique individual identifying markers, for instance 
VIN-numbers, or IP- or MAC- addresses, data-mining techniques will 
almost certainly be able to reconstruct personal identifying information 
about particular vehicles and by extension their regular occupants.133 
The way this data is used will be the subject of regulation and legal 
controversy. Concerns about user privacy have already drawn 
substantial attention from the media.134 
The privacy concerns fall broadly into two categories: government 
access to and use of locational and other personal data, and the private, 
primarily commercial, use of the personal data. These issues are 
parallel to the concerns that are already emerging around the use of 
personal data generated by cellular phones, GPS devices, and Internet 
usage, and so the law surrounding many of these issues may be 
substantially settled well before any fully autonomous vehicles are 
ready for the market. The connected vehicle technologies that will 
almost certainly precede autonomous vehicles to the market will raise 
essentially the same or very similar privacy and security concerns as 
autonomous cars. NHTSA recently announced plans to require the 
inclusion of connected vehicle technologies, including both V2V and 
V2I, for all new vehicles 2014 connected vehicles initiative.135 These 
technologies are therefore likely to be commonplace well before 
autonomous vehicles enter the consumer market. How these issues will 
be resolved is very uncertain, however, and the path privacy law takes 
will certainly have an impact on the rate of autonomous vehicle 
adoption. Federal privacy law in respect to these technologies is 
extremely underdeveloped and is the subject of a great deal of 
controversy, with interested parties having substantially incompatible 
views. 
Consider how businesses may make use of personal data 
generated by autonomous vehicles. Automakers and other companies 
 133. See Glancy, supra note 131, at 1196, 1200 (showing how individual identity can be 
determined without reference to explicit identifiers). 
 134. See, e.g., Doug Newcomb, Privacy Group Voices Concerns Over Google-Backed 
Autonomous Vehicle Legislation, WIRED (June 1, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/ 
06/watchdog-autonomous-privacy; John M. Simpson, Blog, DMV’s Autonomous Vehicle 
Regulations Must Protect Users’ Privacy, CONSUMER WATCHDOG (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www 
.consumerwatchdog.org/blog/dmv%E2%80%99s-autonomous-vehicle-regulations-must-protect-
users%E2%80%99-privacy. 
 135. See generally NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NHTSA ANNOUNCES 
DECISION TO MOVE FORWARD WITH VEHICLE-TO-VEHICLE COMMUN. TECH. FOR LIGHT 
VEHICLES (Feb. 3, 2014), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases 
/2014/USDOT+to+Move+Forward+with+Vehicle-to-Vehicle+Communication+Technology+for 
+Light+Vehicles. 
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involved in autonomous vehicle technology have already received 
patents relating to in-car advertising.136 Manufacturers or third parties 
could create advertising profiles based on the past travel of individual 
vehicles, derived from metadata that although not specifically identi-
fying individuals as such, effectively achieves the same function. These 
advertising profiles could be linked to similar profiles derived from 
Internet usage patterns and other consumer data.137 Advertising would 
then be able to be specifically tailored to the vehicles’ occupants, and 
channeled into the car and its passive occupants, or even into the 
surrounding external environment, à la Steven Spielberg’s film 
Minority Report.138 The technology that would allow this sort of 
individualized targeting of ads based on aggregated metadata is already 
widely used in other contexts and underlies much of the advertising on 
the Internet.139 
If route planning is left to private commercial entities, additional 
concerns may arise. In an extension of the in-vehicle advertising 
scenario, it is easily conceivable that a vehicle’s route could be planned, 
without the users’ knowledge, so that it happens to go by the physical 
businesses of paid advertisers. Past driving and purchasing habits could 
be analyzed to determine businesses a user would be likely to make 
impulse purchases from, and routing and advertising could then be 
coordinated to encourage the vehicle users to make unplanned stops. 
Vehicles could easily be routed so that, when they need to be refueled 
 136. For instance, in-car advertising that will likely make extensive use of locational and 
other personal data are emerging. Google has already patented technology that would enable ad-
based taxi services, which would offer free or discounted trips to the brick-and-mortar locations 
of advertisers. See Ron Amado, Google Patents Ad-Powered Taxi Service That Would Offer Free 
Rides to Shoppers, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 23, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2014/ 
01/google-patents-ad-powered-taxi-service-that-would-offer-free-rides-to-shoppers. Ford has 
patented in-car advertiser technology, and both Ford and BMW are preparing to release in-car 
advertising apps. See Damon Lavrinc, You Can Order a Pizza With Ford’s New In-Car App, 
WIRED (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2014/01/ford-applink-dominos-parking/; 
BMW Developing In-Car Advertising App, CARADVICE, http://www.caradvice.com.au/267639/ 
bmw-developing-in-car-advertising-app (last visited Mar. 28, 2014). 
 137. Among the many types of data available about individuals are records of their past 
purchases. Data brokerages gather and sell this information and it is put to myriad uses. For 
instance, certain purchasing habits are shown to be strongly correlated to credit worthiness, 
apparently including such trivial items felt furniture coaster pads. Thus, aggregated personal data 
may be used as a proxy for a credit score in contexts where the law forbids credit from being 
considered. See Steve Henn, If There’s Privacy in the Digital Age, It Has a New Definition, NPR 
(Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/03/03/285 
334820/if-theres-privacy-in-the-digital-age-it-has-a-new-definition. 
 138. MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002). 
 139. U.S. Patent No. US 20120054028 A1 (filed Aug. 31, 2010). 
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the nearest gas stations would tend to belong to a company that paid 
for that privilege. 
Vehicle routing and locational data raises concerns about privacy 
and autonomy relative to the government, as well. If government has 
access to users’ routing information, it can easily derive information of 
a deeply personal nature—as New York’s highest court recently 
described: 
Disclosed in [locational] data . . . will be trips the indisputably 
private nature . . . trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the 
abortion clinic, . . . the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or 
church, the gay bar and on and on[.] . . . [I]t will be possible to tell . . . 
with ever increasing precision who we are and are not with, [and] 
when we are and are not with them[].140 
Government having unfettered access to this data could only have 
a chilling effect on free speech and the expression of political dissent. 
If a vehicle’s navigation route decision is actually made by a 
centralized government network, there will be additional concerns 
about whether this infringes on the individual right to privacy, 
including the right to physical autonomy. Vehicle rerouting may be put 
to such questionable ends as routing traffic away from public protests. 
Other concerns that may arise if these decisions were left to the 
government include possible objections from individuals who were 
consistently forced to use a route slower than optimal, for the sake of 
overall traffic efficiency and at the expense of the individual’s time. 
Governments may reserve access to faster routes options to those 
willing and able to pay for the privilege.141 
Existing federal privacy protections are clearest and strongest 
where the party seeking access to an individual’s private data is doing 
so under the authority of the government. The Fourth Amendment 
guarantees that individuals shall be “secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”142 
Under present case law, this clause creates a broad right to privacy, 
including a right to have electronic communications and private data 
protected, in contexts where individuals have a “reasonable expectation 
of privacy,” and where it would be unreasonable for the government to 
 140. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (2009). 
 141. This practice would mirror the subscription-based, reserved fast lanes on highways in 
cities such as Atlanta. See e.g., I-85 Express Lanes are Open, STATE ROAD & TOLLWAY AUTH., 
http://www.peachpass.com/peach-pass-toll-facilities/about-i-85-express-lanes (last visited Mar. 
28, 2014). 
 142. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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violate this expectation of privacy.143 The application of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test has been unpredictable in the past,144 and it 
is not clear whether such a reasonable expectation of privacy will be 
found to exist with respect to vehicular location information derived 
from GPS data or other tracking technology. 
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Jones,145 recently held that 
police placement of a GPS device on a person’s vehicle and subsequent 
monitoring of that person’s movements constituted a search under the 
terms of the Fourth Amendment, but the Court declined to decide 
whether the search was unreasonable.146 The Court held that, because 
automobiles were “effects” under the Fourth Amendment, the 
placement of the GPS device on the vehicle was a physical trespass.147 
Because of this, the majority concluded that it did not need to reach the 
question of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed that 
would make GPS tracking an unconstitutional violation of the 
Amendment, even in the narrow context of the case, where the GPS 
device had placed on a vehicle by police, without a warrant, in the 
course of an investigation.148 
Justice Alito, joined by three other justices, concurred in the 
judgment in Jones and would have found that a reasonable expectation 
of privacy existed under the circumstances of the case.149 Justice 
Sotomayor wrote a concurrence arguing that she would have found the 
use of the GPS tracking data to be contrary to a reasonable expectation 
of privacy given the facts of Jones, and argued further that such a 
reasonable expectation of privacy would exist even if the police had 
not physically placed the GPS device on the vehicle but instead relied 
on technology already present in the car.150 She suggests: 
GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. . 
. . Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associa-
tional and expressive freedoms. And the Government's unrestrained 
 143. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361–62 (1967) (Harlan, J, concurring). 
 144. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 145. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 146. Id. at 949. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957–58 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 150. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is 
susceptible to abuse.151 
Thus, at least five justices might consider government tracking of 
autonomous or connected vehicles to be a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment’s privacy guarantee, at least in some contexts. Given the 
difference between individual police tracking of one particular auto-
mobile compared to the possibility of tracking at will the potentially 
vast network of connected automobiles, it is not at all certain whether 
the courts would find a reasonable expectation of privacy to exist in the 
context of autonomous or otherwise connected vehicles. 
Even if a strong expectation of privacy were found relative to GPS 
and other types of locational data, it is not clear that this would present 
government with a substantial barrier preventing access to the 
locational data history of individual autonomous or connected vehicle 
users, if the government is able to obtain this data from private sources 
to whom the vehicle users have constructively granted access. The 
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled in In re U.S. 
for Historical Cell Site Data that, in the context of a criminal 
investigation and as specifically authorized by section 2703(d) of the 
Stored Communications Act (“SCA”),152 police had not committed a 
per se violation of the Fourth Amendment by requesting a court order 
requiring cellular phone service companies to provide historical loca-
tion data of three cellphone users suspected of criminal activity, with-
out having first obtaining a warrant or demonstrating probable cause.153 
The court characterized the cellphone companies’ records of individual 
users’ past locational data as mere “business records,” documenting the 
voluntary communication of the phone user’s locational data to his 
cellular service provider, where the user was “not conveying location 
information to anyone other than his service provider.”154 The court 
held “a conventional order for a third party's voluntarily created 
business records [does not] transform[] into a Fourth Amendment 
search or seizure when the records . . . shed light on a target's activities 
in an area traditionally protected from governmental intrusion.”155 
Thus, barring further rulings or legislation to the contrary, it is likely 
that the government could access an individuals’ autonomous vehicle 
location history by requesting records from a third party, such as the 
 151. Id. 
 152. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2013). 
 153. In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013) 
 154. Id. at 612. 
 155. Id. at 615. 
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car’s manufacturer, and thereby skirt the Fourth Amendment concerns 
raised by Sotomayor in Jones.156 As described below, there are 
presently only very weak protections in place limiting the collection of 
personal data, including locational data, by businesses. Thus, In re U.S. 
for Historical Cell Site Data presents a very plausible means by which 
government may be able to circumvent Fourth Amendment barriers to 
surveillance.  
Even if the courts where to hold that the locational data such as 
that sought in In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data is not a mere 
business record, it is likely that other data would be available to 
governments that may be sufficient to reconstruct a detailed locational 
history of a particular vehicle. By examining metadata and disregarding 
explicit individual identifiers, governments may be able to bypass the 
Fourth Amendment issues altogether while being able to reconstruct 
the individual movements of particular vehicles.157 The ongoing 
litigation over the National Security Agency’s large-scale use of 
internet and cellular phone metadata to track the movements and 
behavior of individuals may lead to the further specification of the 
government’s ability to access and analysis these types of data.158 
Legislators have attempted and continue to attempt to regulate the 
use of GPS and other locational data in order to protect users’ privacy. 
For instance, the Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act has been 
introduced multiple times since 2011.159 This Act would prohibit, under 
most circumstances, acquisition by the Government of an individual’s 
geolocation data without first establishing probable cause and 
obtaining a warrant.160 The Act, and similar proposed legislation, 
appears to have substantial bipartisan support, but despite this, it has 
not yet been put to a vote.161 
Autonomous vehicles will likely generate other forms of data, not 
necessarily associated with location or historical destinations, over 
which users may still have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In the 
 156. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 157. Cf. Glancy, supra note 131, at 1196, 1200 (showing how individual identity can be 
determined without reference to explicit identifiers). 
 158. Cf. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 2013 WL 6819708 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013) 
(holding the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection program to be lawful) (appeal pending). 
 159. Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R. 1312, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Geolocation Privacy Legislation, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/policy/legislation/gps-act/ (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2015) (showing that the GPS act has been introduced during the 112th, 113th, and 
114th Congresses). 
 160. H.R. 1312 sec. 2(a), §§ 2603–04. 
 161. Geolocation Privacy Legislation, supra note 159. 
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realm of non-autonomous but highly connected vehicles, such data 
would include information about a user’s driving habits, such as 
information about rates of acceleration, speed, braking data, and the 
like, which could be used to demonstrate liability in case of accidents, 
to form an individualized and empirical basis for car insurance rates, or 
even to automate the process of traffic law enforcement.162 These 
particular privacy concerns may be less relevant in a world of fully 
autonomous vehicles, where individual vehicle occupants would likely 
be unable to cause the vehicle to disobey traffic rules. Still, it is possible 
that autonomous vehicles may generate data that could be construed as 
evidence of liability it certain contexts, which could raise Fourth 
Amendment issues. Future vehicles may default to recording in-cabin 
sounds or video, perhaps ostensibly for analysis in case of accidents.163 
If such data were stored, it seems there would likely be a strong 
expectation of privacy relative to its use in many contexts. 
While some limited protections exist preventing the government 
from unrestrained access to vehicle users’ private data, very little 
regulation exists preventing private parties from collecting, aggregat-
ing, analyzing, marketing, and monetizing individuals’ private data in 
whatever creative ways they might imagine. 
The Government Accountability Office (GOA) recently summa-
rized the existing federal law governing private-sector use of personal 
information.164 Aside from limited protection provided to children 
under thirteen years old by the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act,165 and the relatively strong consumer data privacy guaranteed in 
the narrower realms of credit reporting and health care,166 GAO identi-
fied the only federal limitation on the use of personal data in a 
 162. This type of data is already collected by many vehicles’ EDR’s. EDR’s as noted in 
Section I, became mandatory for all new cars in 2014. Although current regulations limit the use 
of EDR data, it is conceivable that it may become the basis for the automated enforcement of 
traffic laws.  
 163. Some new vehicles are already recording cabin audio, including the 2015 Corvette 
Stingray. The data recorder in this model records video from the drivers’ perspective as well as 
any in-vehicle noise. The Stingray is a high-performance sports car and this data is ostensibly 
recorded so that the driver can review past laps on a racetrack, for example. See Jaclyn Trop, The 
Next Data Privacy Battle May Be Waged Inside Your Car, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/the-next-privacy-battle-may-be-waged-inside-you 
r-car.html. 
 164. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-903, MOBILE DEVICE LOCATION 
DATA: ADDITIONAL FEDERAL ACTION COULD HELP PROTECT CONSUMER PRIVACY 7 (2012) 
[hereinafter MOBILE DEVICE LOCATION DATA REPORT]. 
 165. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2013). 
 166. Under the regimes established by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
81x (2013), and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
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prohibition of “unfair or deceptive acts or practices affecting com-
merce,” arising from the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).167 
GAO further explained: 
“An act or practice is unfair if the injury it causes or is likely to cause 
to consumers is: (1) substantial; (2) not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition; and (3) not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves. . . . [an act] or 
practice is deceptive if: (1) it is likely to mislead consumers acting 
reasonably under the circumstances; and (2) it is material, that is, 
likely to affect consumers’ conduct or decisions with respect to the 
product at issue.”168 
According to GAO, this provision of the FTCA allows in contexts 
where “[a] company was not adhering to the practices to protect a 
consumer’s personal information that the company claimed to abide by 
in its privacy policy.”169 
Thus, existing federal protections of personal data are minimal at 
best. In the limited contexts where consumer data is protected from 
certain uses by law, it is often the case that businesses can easily include 
boilerplate contract language and thus avoid liability. There is, 
however, substantial pressure from within the federal government and 
from external privacy advocacy groups to reform and enhance 
consumer data privacy protections. In February 2012, the Obama 
administration called for Congress to develop and adopt what it called 
the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (CPBR), which, inter alia, would 
guarantee individuals control over “how companies collect, use, or 
disclose [their] personal data.”170 
The CPBR would in effect give legal force to the FTC’s long-
standing but non-enforceable guidelines for consumer data best 
practices, the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs),171 which are 
characterized in the White House’s Consumer Data Privacy in a 
Networked World as including: individual control over what personal 
104-191, 100 Stat. 2548 (1996). 
 167. MOBILE DEVICE LOCATION DATA REPORT, supra note 164 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45). 
 168. Id. at 7 n.11 (internal citations omitted). 
 169. Id. at 7. 
 170. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED 
WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE 
GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 11 (2012) [hereinafter PRIVACY BLUEPRINT], available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf. 
 171. The FIPPs framework originated in a 1973 report on Automated Personal Data 
Systems. See DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA 
SYSTEMS ch. IV (1973) (“Recommended Safeguards for Administrative Personal Data Systems”). 
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data businesses can collect and how this data may be used; transparency 
in businesses’ data collection, privacy and security practices; respect 
for context, recognizing that “consumers have a right to expect that 
companies will collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are 
consistent with the context in which consumers provide the 
data[]”172and the secure handling of personal, private data; the 
consumers’ right to access and ensure the accuracy of personal data; 
the principle of focused collection, guaranteeing reasonable limits on 
the personal data that companies collect and retain.173 To these 
established FIPPs principles, the CPBR would add a right of 
accountability, ensuring that the preceding principles would be 
enforced.174 
Among the more substantial guarantees of the CPBR would be the 
consumer’s right to access and verify the accuracy of personal data 
stored by private companies, providing individuals with “the means 
and opportunity to correct inaccurate data or request its deletion or use 
limitation,”175 as well as a right to impose “reasonable limits on the 
personal data that companies collect and retain,”176 restricting the 
collection and use of personal data appropriate to the context in which 
the users provided them with the data.177 The White House 
recommended that the CPBR be implemented as “enforceable codes of 
conduct,” developed through a “multistakeholder process,” involving 
“individual companies, industry groups, privacy advocates, consumer 
groups, crime victims, academics, international partners, State 
Attorneys General, Federal civil and criminal law enforcement 
representatives, and other relevant groups[.]”178 Envisioning such a 
process, the White House document does not provide any model 
language for legislation or regulation. 
Government bodies and other organizations have advanced 
proposals similar to the White House’s CPBR, developed contempo-
raneously to the White House document or in the two years since the 
White House document was issued. For instance, in a March 2012 
report the FTC released a set of recommendations very much in-line 
with those of the White House, seeking cooperation between stake-
holders and policymakers in developing what would ultimately be an 
 172. PRIVACY BLUEPRINT, supra note 170, at 15. 
 173. Id. at 18–20. 
 174. Id. at 21. 
 175. Id. at 19. 
 176. Id. at 21. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 23. 
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enforceable code of conduct modeled on the FIPPs.179 In September 
2012, GAO issued a report recommending that the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration work with 
stakeholders to develop an analogous code of conduct relating spe-
cifically to location data derived from mobile devices.180 
An earlier effort at establishing a variation on the FIPPs specific 
to the connected vehicle context was Vehicle Infrastructure Integration 
(VII) Coalition’s VII Privacy Policy Framework.181 The VII Coalition, 
disbanded in 2007, was an association of automakers, privacy advocate 
groups, and other interested parties, organized by the DOT that studied 
the potential implementation of a DSRC-based connected vehicle 
system to enhance vehicle safety.182 The VII Privacy Policy 
Framework, achieved by consensus-building between the participant 
stakeholders and not legally binding, promulgated principles including 
“Respect for Privacy and Personal Information[,] . . . Information 
Purposes, Acquisition, Notice, Fair Information Use, Information 
Protection and Retention, Openness, Participation and 
Accountability.”183 Beyond this repetition of familiar FIPPs principles, 
the Framework included hard “privacy limits” that sought to limit the 
possibility of personal identifiers broadcast over DSRC being collected 
and used without the individual vehicle operators’ consent.184 Legal 
scholar Dorothy Glancy has suggested that the VII Privacy Policy 
Framework should be adopted as a model for establishing autonomous 
vehicle privacy standards, both as an example of stakeholder consensus 
building and because of the strong protections it would provide against 
the wholesale acquisition of user identifiers.185 
It is clear that there is broad resistance to the very business-
friendly status quo in the area of consumer data privacy rights, but it is 
less clear that anything like the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights will 
actually be enacted in the foreseeable future. Further, given the deep 
involvement in the policy-making process interested companies will 
 179. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), http://www.ftc.gov 
/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-
privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 180. MOBILE DEVICE LOCATION DATA REPORT, supra note 164, at 37. 
 181. LESLIE JOHNSON ET AL., VII PRIVACY POLICY FRAMEWORK VERSION 1.0.2 (2008), 
available at http://financecommission.dot.gov/Documents/April2008Meetings_Hearings/VII_ 
Privacy_Policies_Framework-Approved_by_ELT.pdf 
 182. Id. 
 183. Glancy, supra note 133, at 1233. 
 184. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 181, at 23. 
 185. Glancy, supra note 133, at 1235. 
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have as key stakeholders, it is perhaps doubtful that even if something 
akin to the CPBR were to be implemented that it would present a very 
great obstacle to the use of personal data in all but the most plainly 
illegitimate circumstances. In any case it appears that little substantive 
movement toward bringing the White House’s proposal to fruition has 
been made in the intervening years, and in the meantime Big Data 
business techniques have become more and more ubiquitous. Unless 
consumers are more consistently vocal in their opposition to the 
commercial use of data derived from their vehicle use patterns then 
they have been historically to the use of similar data derived from their 
cellular phone, credit card, and internet usage habits, it seems unlikely 
that businesses in the automated and connected vehicle industries will 
be substantially barred from using consumer data in whatever manner 
they see fit. 
Another route by which more substantial consumer data pro-
tection may conceivably come about would be through action by state 
governments. Sufficiently populous and powerful states may have 
leverage sufficient to require autonomous vehicle makers to disclose to 
state residents the data they collect and the uses to which the that data 
is put. Such legislation has already been proposed in California.186 The 
Consumer Vehicle Information Choice and Control Act seeks to 
require manufacturers of new motor vehicles sold after January 1, 2016 
to make disclosures to the vehicles’ owners regarding the information 
generated and collected by the vehicle.187 The owner would have full 
and sole access to the information and be able to transmit it to a third 
party.188 The manufacturer would not be able to take action against the 
owner for accessing or using the information.189 In limited 
circumstances a manufacturer or medical researcher would be able to 
access and use the collected information, provided all personally 
identifying information is removed.190 If California or another state 
succeeds in passing such legislation, it will likely not have the same 
level of national impact that California’s strict vehicle emissions laws 
have had. This is because the bill will not necessarily require the 
vehicle makers invest in any special new technology in order to access 
California’s large markets—technology which would then be native to 
all vehicles whether they were sold in California or not. Instead, it 
 186. S.B. 994, Leg. 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. 7 (Cal. 2014), available at 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB994. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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would only grant a special right of access to information to vehicle 
owners in that state, leaving the manufacturers with full control of the 
data for users in every jurisdiction that was not subject to equivalent 
legislation.  
The 2012 push for consumer privacy protections seems to have 
made little progress, but there is some recent movement in Washington 
with respect to automakers’ usage of personal data. In a December 2, 
2013 open letter to auto industry executives, Senator Edward Markey 
of Massachusetts raised concerns about the disclosure of individual 
user data and aggregated data from vehicles currently on the market, 
seeking information from automakers as to whom this data is shared 
with or sold to, how long the data is kept, whether vehicle users have 
any option to delete this data or else to have it not retained at all, and 
similar questions.191 Senator Markey requested that automakers 
respond to his inquiry no later than January 3, 2014.192 The Senator has 
not disclosed whether any responses were submitted, and if so, whether 
these responses will be made public. 
VI. SECURITY, CYBERATTACKS, AND TERRORISM 
Senator Markey’s letter also focuses its attention on the vulnera-
bility of connected vehicles to cyberattacks, citing DARPA-funded 
research that exposed the susceptibility of the electronic control units 
of certain vehicles already on the market.193 These vehicles could be 
hacked, enabling external control of braking, acceleration, and steer-
ing.194 Senator Markey asked the manufacturers for information on 
their plans for overcoming these risks.195 Such information would be 
helpful in determining the feasibility of NHTSA’s stated goal of 
insulating the automated, connected vehicle infrastructure it foresees 
from potential cyberattacks.196 
Although the primary example of vehicle hacking cited by Senator 
Markey relied on being physically present in the vehicle, contemporary 
cars have been proven susceptible to wireless attacks as well. 
Researchers from Rutgers and the University of Southern California 
were able to control vehicles’ electronic control units (ECUs), accessed 
 191. Letter from Edward J. Markey, Senator, to Auto Industry Executives, at 7 (Dec. 2, 
2013), available at http://www.markey.senate.gov/documents/2013-12-2_GM.pdf. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 1; see also CHARLIE MILLER & CHRIS VALASEK, ADVENTURES IN AUTOMOTIVE 
NETWORKS AND CONTROL UNITS (2013), available at http://illmatics.com/car_hacking.pdf. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Markey, supra note 191. 
 196. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 8. 
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through their wireless tire pressure monitoring systems.197 It has been 
suggested that an attack might be staged by exploiting a vehicle’s EDR 
system, which in newer vehicles are accessible wirelessly and may 
communicate remotely with emergency response centers.198 The 
remote hijacking of autonomous vehicles presents a very serious risk 
in a world of fully automated motor vehicles, where, for instance, 
traditional traffic signals would be rendered obsolete by the possibility 
of coordinating the flow of traffic through intersections, making real-
time speed adjustments such that traffic from two perpendicular 
multilane highways could cross paths without any vehicles coming to 
a stop or even substantially slowing down. One vehicle making a 
sudden and unannounced change in its path could cause significant 
damage and disruption. Many autonomous vehicles being hijacked at 
once in an urban center could lead to terror on the scale of the 
September 11 attacks.  
Ensuring that autonomous and connected vehicle technologies are 
secure from such exploitation is a responsibility of NHTSA.199 DOT 
and NHTSA, as well as various industry players, are dedicating 
significant resources to understand strategies to insulate vehicles from 
attack.200 NHTSA has stated its goal of developing an “initial baseline 
set of requirements”201 to ensure that the ECUs in contemporary and 
future vehicles, including autonomous vehicles, are secure from 
cyberattack.202 In NHTSA’s Preliminary Statement, the Agency 
suggests that the process of developing these requirements should be 
complete within four years of that document’s 2013 publication.203 
Although the evidence suggests that the ECUs of vehicles 
currently on the market are not well secured against attack, it does 
appear at least that such attacks would attach federal criminal liability 
to their perpetrators. Any substantial attempt at an attack designed to 
exploit and take control over a modern car’s ECUs would almost 
certainly subject the attacker to federal criminal liability under the 
 197. See Peter Bright, Cars Hacked Through Wireless Tire Sensors, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 
10, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/security/news/2010/08/cars-hacked-through-wireless-tyre-
sensors.ars. 
 198. Balough & Balough, supra note 35, at 1. 
 199. See PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 8. 
 200. See NHTSA V2V Security Credential Management System ANPRM, FR Doc. 2014–
24482, 79 Fed. Reg. 61927 (Oct. 14, 2014). 
 201. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 7. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 8. 
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Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),204 the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA),205 the Wiretap Act,206 and potentially the USA 
PATRIOT Act.207 
VII. REGULATORY OPTIONS, COMMERCIAL PROSPECTS AND THE 
POTENTIAL PACE OF CHANGE 
Although automotive industry analysts have attempted to antici-
pate the timing of automated vehicle technology deployment based on 
a variety of factors, the authors have concluded that timing will be 
substantially affected by three key variables that are generally 
unacknowledged by industry analysts. Each of these three variables 
involves the promise of significantly improved vehicle safety.  
Beyond necessary technological developments, analysts generally 
concur that the following factors, expressed as barriers to achieving 
successive levels of automation, must be ameliorated to arrive at Levels 
2 and 3, and eventually eliminated to arrive at Level 4:  
(1)  Limited driver acceptance of diminished control over vehicles. As 
noted in the report jointly issued by the Center for Automotive 
Research and KPMG LLP: “There is no margin for error with 
safety-critical technologies. They must work perfectly every time; 
life and death hang in the balance. Consumers will not relinquish 
control until they are certain their vehicles and the mobile 
environment are 100 percent safe and reliable.”208 
(2)  Unacceptably high technology costs with respect to both automated 
vehicle technology and accompanying infrastructure. Presently, 
only 20% of consumers surveyed would be willing to spend as much 
as $3,000 for automated vehicle features.209 
(3)  Lack of cybersecurity, particularly with respect to V2V and V2I 
technologies that by their nature involve multiple, and perhaps 
many, vehicles whose functioning could be disrupted to cause 
catastrophic damage. NHTSA and DOT are working together with 
 204. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008) 
 205. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
 206. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (June 19, 1968); Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(Oct. 21, 1986) (amending the Wiretap Act to include electronic communication). 
 207. Arguments for and against finding liability under these acts can be found in Balough 
& Balough, supra note 35, at 5–7. The authors of that article are perhaps unduly skeptical that a 
vehicle’s ECUs would be found to be “protected computers” under the language of CFAA, 
suggesting that they may not sufficiently be “used in or affect[] interstate or foreign commerce.” 
The DMCA similarly requires that an intercepted communication affect interstate commerce. 
 208. KPMG & CTR. FOR AUTO. RESEARCH, supra note 22, at 19. 
 209. Id. at 20. 
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industry to establish a secure V2V credentialing system that may 
alleviate these concerns.210 
(4)  Lack of aftermarket automated vehicle technologies to accel-erate 
vehicle market penetration and, therefore, consumer acceptance and 
technology cost reductions. 
Uncertainty as to who is liable for damages caused by automated 
vehicle crashes is cited by industry analysts as an impediment to 
implementing truly autonomous Level 4 vehicles,211 but the authors 
view this as a concern to be addressed, rather than a fundamental 
impediment. As vehicle automation serves to reduce both crash rates 
and associated damage claims, the risk borne by insurance companies 
will also decline.212 To maintain competitive standing, insurers can be 
expected to adapt timely to liability issues as technological advances 
reveal them, although they may resist providing insurance for Level 3 
and 4 vehicles if there is any possibility of technology failure or cyber-
hacking that could cause catastrophic damage involving multiple 
vehicles and property owned by third parties. Similarly, states, which 
must enact legislation authorizing the use of Level 3 and Level 4 
vehicles on roadways, will likely resist doing so until they determine 
that such vehicles will not pose unreasonable safety hazards, probably 
with input from insurers. Other systems, such as the nation’s system of 
air travel, have been insurable despite similar liability issues as those 
presented by autonomous vehicles systems. The authors recommend 
that significant resources be dedicated by stakeholders to formulating 
a proposed “architecture” for insuring autonomous vehicle systems.  
With respect to legal battles over general responsibility for 
damages, those proven responsible for damages should be held 
accountable within the traditional, tort-based legal framework, though 
the process of determining liability can be expected to become more 
complicated as technology becomes more complex and the number and 
types of technology providers increases, as discussed in Section I. 
Data privacy concerns are also cited as an impediment to imple-
menting automated vehicles.213 However, as we have shown, privacy 
concerns are not generally different in the automated vehicle context 
than any other involving technology developments accompanied by the 
prolific dissemination and accumulation of personal information. 
 210. See NHTSA V2V Security Credential Management System ANPRM, FR Doc. 2014–
24482, 79 Fed. Reg. 61927 (Oct. 14, 2014). 
 211. SHANKER ET AL., supra note 28, at 18. 
 212. Id. at 57. 
 213. See Wood et al., supra note 47 at 1448. See generally, Glancy, supra note 131. 
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Therefore, it would seem that privacy concerns in the automated 
vehicle context should not be any more of an impediment to the intro-
duction of automated vehicle technology than has been the case with 
respect to other already widely-adopted technologies, such as social 
media, smartphones, or GPS navigation. Accordingly, barring a cata-
strophic misuse of personal information by vehicle manufacturers or 
related parties that accumulate information, the regulation of private 
information use in the automated vehicle context should not be 
expected to proceed at a different pace than with respect to such other 
technologies.  
The three safety-related variables identified by the authors as 
significant factors affecting the timing of automated vehicle technology 
implementation are: 
(1) the degree to which automobile manufacturers conclude that safety-
related automated vehicle technologies present profitable 
commercial opportunities; 
(2) the extent to which they perceive implementation of such tech-
nologies to be a corporate social responsibility; and 
(3) whether NHTSA will accelerate deployment by preemptively 
mandating vehicle automation technologies.  
A confluence of circumstances indicates that automobile manu-
facturers and NHTSA may move aggressively with respect to tech-
nology implementation, rather than reluctantly. First, the proliferation 
of developing, existing and implemented vehicle automation safety 
features is enabling the development of a vision of radically safer 
vehicle travel. That vision should not necessarily be impaired by 
automobile manufacturers’ reluctance to commercialize safety 
technologies because experiences of the past four decades demonstrate 
that safety features that add to the cost of vehicles (e.g., airbags) are 
frequently desired, and sometimes eventually sought after, by 
consumers, rather than avoided. 
The hazards of vehicle travel are seen in data gathered and 
published by NHTSA. In 2011, the last year for which NHTSA has 
publicly released data, 2,217,000 people were injured in American 
crashes; 32,367 people were killed; and 3,778,000 crashes caused 
property damage.214 These statistics represent a significant decline in 
incidents, as measured annually, over the preceding three years; but 
over the course of the preceding ten years, a total of 392,872 people 
 214. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 811 753, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 
2011 DATA 1 (2013). 
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were killed in vehicle crashes and 25,397,000 were injured.215 In 
consideration of these statistics, vehicle crashes are an immense social 
issue, with associated costs in terms of loss of life, limb and property. 
The NHTSA recognizes the gravity of this issue and hopes to address 
it by expanding the use of more advanced crash avoidance 
technologies.216 The issue persists even in the face of enormous strides 
made by automobile manufacturers toward improving vehicle safety, 
intensified enforcement of laws that prohibit driving under the 
influence of alcohol and narcotics, increasing disinterest in driving 
among younger people who are disproportionally involved in vehicle 
crashes, and NHTSA’s robust regulatory scheme of regulations, 
including mandated safety features such as airbags, seatbelts and 
electronic stability control.217  
If the next frontier for significantly, or perhaps radically, 
improved vehicle safety is to be found in automated vehicle tech-
nology, then NHTSA has several methods with which to advance its 
implementation. Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety 
Act,218 NHTSA may establish vehicle safety standards for new motor 
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment, require the recall and remedy of 
vehicles and equipment that do not comply with standards, conduct 
investigations into safety defects, and require the recall and remedy of 
motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment determined to have a 
safety defect.219 As noted by Wood, case law indicates that “NHTSA 
can establish standards to require the installation of certain specific 
equipment on vehicles and establish performance standards for that 
equipment.”220 Under the Safety Act, standards must be performance-
oriented, objective, meet the need for safety and be practicable.221 
Further, NHTSA hosts its New Car Assessment Program, under which 
vehicle crashworthiness is ranked on a five-star scale (for which five 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–33118 (2013).  
 219. Id. § 30110 (motor vehicle safety standards), § 30166(b) (authority to conduct 
inspections or investigations), § 30120 (remedies for defects or noncompliance), § 30118 
(notification of defects or noncompliance). 
 220. Wood et al., supra note 47, at 1450. To support this, Wood cites Washington v. Dept. 
of Transp., 84 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding NHTSA’s regulatory authority enables it to 
require specific equipment be installed in vehicles). Additional cases cited in Wood and in the 
Washington v. DOT case in support of this authority include Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp. 865 
F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988); Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1969); Automotive 
Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 221. Wood et al., supra note 47, at 1450. 
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stars is highest) and information about selected advanced crash 
avoidance technologies is made available to the public to promote such 
technologies.222 As Wood also notes, “NHTSA selects crash avoidance 
technologies for inclusion in NCAP’s crash avoidance ratings program 
based on technical maturity of the technology, the availability of the 
technology in the current fleet, and the availability of safety 
effectiveness data for the technology.”223 
Therefore, NHTSA can speed the implementation of automated 
vehicle technologies by establishing standards that require such tech-
nology, so long as such standards are performance-oriented, objective, 
meet the need for safety and are practicable. Alternatively, it can simply 
establish standards as the automotive industry rolls out technology, 
while also encouraging the proliferation of technology by including it 
in its New Car Assessment Program.  
Different than ever before, however, the proliferation of 
technology provides NHTSA with regulatory opportunities, while 
automobile manufacturers may also conclude they have commercial 
opportunities, and a social responsibility, to accelerate the adoption of 
automated vehicle technologies and, in so doing, further address the 
hazards of vehicle travel. 
 222. Id. at 1426–27. 
 223. Id. at 1494. 
 
